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Abstract
This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There
are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets
a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to
invest gets information based on what happens with the first investor, as
well as cost reduction benefits. We describe the payoff functions for both
the leader and follower firm. Then, we present a stochastic control game
where the firms can choose when to invest, and hence influence whether
they become the leader or the follower. In order to solve this problem, we
combine techniques from optimal stopping and game theory. For a specific
choice of parametres, we show that no pure symmetric subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium exists. However, an asymmetric equilibrium is charac-
terized. In this equilibrium, two disjoint intervals of market demand level
give rise to preemptive investment behavior of the firms, while the firms
otherwise are more reluctant to be the first mover.
Keywords: Duopoly, stochastic game, preemption, optimal stop-
ping, irreversible investment.
JEL subject classification: L130, L260, C720, C730.
1 Introduction
This paper studies how a two-firm preemptive investment game is affected when
the firms involved have two investment opportunities instead of one. We com-
pare this to the classic duopoly investment model, see e.g. Fudenberg and
Tirole [7].
The analysis is motivated by Décamps et al [4]. They show that adding
another investment choice to a monopoly game gives rise to a dichotomous
investment region. That is, the investment region is no longer a connected set,
and it is this dichotomy that causes the preemption game to change structure.
We model a duopoly which operates in a market where there is a stochastic,
exogenous demand, driven by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). The firms
can at any time carry out a costly investment, where they must choose between
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Dahl and Stokkereit
two different technologies. The investment is irreversible, and can only be done
one time by each firm. The investment reward is a higher profit rate and hence
a greater income. However, how much the technologies increase the firm’s profit
is uncertain; each investment can either end up in a high profit state or a low
profit state. As soon as the leader has invested, the profit state of his investment
choice is revealed to both firms. Also, for the follower the investment cost of
copying the same technology choice is reduced. Hence, being the second investor
has benefits. On the other hand, the first mover will attain a monopoly benefit
due to technological advantage until the second mover has invested. We solve
this problem by using results by Décamps et al [4] combined with game theoretic
techniques based on the analysis of Chevalier-Roignant and Trigiorgis [3].
1.1 Literature overview
Duopoly games often have complicated structures where the firms both com-
pete and cooperate. An important example is the case of cooperative research
effort, which is studied in Aspremont and Jacquemin [1]. The paper models this
cooperation to be active, in the sense that the firms at a R&D stage maximize
their joint profit function, and then compete at a "market stage". Several other
papers study this idea, but many exclude an active cooperative setting, and
instead model the benefits of other firms’ investment by technology spillovers.
Technology spillover is the concept that when one firm attains a new technology,
it becomes easier for other firms to acquire the same technology, for instance
because they can learn from the innovator firm’s research advances. An exam-
ple of such a paper is Femminis and Martini [6]. In this paper, investment is
a "one-shot" action which increases the firms’ profit rate. A certain time after
the first firm has invested, the investment cost is reduced for the second firm.
Thus, the first firm can be seen as an innovator, while the follower can be seen
as an imitator.
Some papers that focus on second mover advantages, due to for instance
information benefits, are Hoppe [8] and Y. J. Yap, S. Luckraz and S. K. Tey [17].
A paper with an in-depth study of imitation versus innovation is Bessen and
Maskin [2]. They consider a setting where the more firms that invest, the bigger
the probability of innovating becomes. However, if one firm succeeds, the other
firms can copy this. This gives incentives to not invest and instead simply
imitate. The paper focuses on social optimality, and compares situations with
and without patents. Also, they cover both a static and a sequential investment
context. Another relevant paper that examines the choice of doing innovation
versus imitation is Jin and Troege [13].
Huisman and Kort [9] analyzes a choice between two investments. However,
the setting of this paper is different from ours, as one does not know when
the second investment opportunity arrives. Other papers studying investment
choice are Décamps et al. [4] and Nishihara and Ohyama [14]. The solution
method we apply in this paper is based on the results in Décamps et al. [4].
However, in contrast to Decamps et al. [4], we study a game between two firms
and we have an additional uncertainty in the profit rate obtained from the
investment. Nishihara and Ohyama [14] studies a game, but without uncertain
profit rate.
The papers by Huisman et al. [10] and [11] both analyze stochastic games
related to real options models. The paper [11] is quite general, but the firms
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only have one investment choice. We extend this by adding another technology.
They study a preemption example, and we extend this example in a way which
results in a more complicated structure of behavior of the firms (contrast Figure
1 in Huisman et al. [11] to our Figure 2). The paper Huisman et al. [10] differs
from ours in that they don’t have a stochastic demand, but rather a Poisson
process for when new information is revealed to the firms.
1.2 Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a mathematical for-
mulation of the model. Then, Section 3 describes the different payoff functions
the firms may attain (depending on the investment outcome). This includes the
case of a simultaneous Cournot investment, being the market follower and being
the market leader. Section 4 presents a stochastic game in this framework. The
game is defined in Section 4.1, based on the approach of Huisman [11]. Then
a specific scenario where double preemption intervals occur is analyzed in Sec-
tion 4.2. We show that no subgame perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium exists
in this case, however, we characterize an asymmetric equilibrium. Finally, we
conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider a framework with two firms, both facing two different irreversible in-
vestment opportunities. We call these investment 1 and investment 2. Both
firms may invest at any time in either of the investment opportunities, but not
in both. When the first firm has invested, thus becoming the leader, nature
chooses one of two outcomes: a high profit outcome or a low profit outcome.
This outcome is determined according to some probability measure. Hence, we
consider a finite probability space (ΩF ,FF , PF ) (the subscript F stands for “fi-
nite”), where ΩF = {ωll , ωhl , ωlh, ωhh}, FF is the corresponding σ-algebra and PF
is a probability measure. Here, ωlh is the scenario where investing in alternative
1 leads to a high profit, denoted pih1 > 0, while investment 2 leads to low profit,
pil2 > 0. Similar interpretations hold for ωll , ω
h
l and ω
h
h . These probabilities are
the same for both firms.
Remark 2.1 The motivation for this problem is to study a model for an invest-
ment game involving uncertainty, since this is more realistic than a deterministic
model. Only considering two possible outcomes is a simplification which is made
to make the computations more manageable. However, similar kinds of argu-
ments can be made for some number n <∞ of potential outcomes, though this
will become chaotic as n grows.
The second firm to invest, thus becoming the follower, can choose what to do
after the leader has invested. The follower observes the outcome of the leader’s
investment. Hence, the follower has the advantage of having more information
than the leader.
The profit rates of the two firms vary according to the state of the game. In
accordance to what is often done in the literature, we normalize such that both
agents get no profit before any investment has occurred. When the first firm has
invested, it immediately gets either profit rate pih1 (high profit, investment 1),
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pil1 (low profit, investment 1), pih2 or pil2, depending on whether the firm chooses
investment 1 or 2, and on which scenario ω ∈ ΩF is realized. Until the second
firm invests, the leader also enjoys a monopoly benefit ξ. The follower continues
to have profit rate 0 until it invests. If it chooses to copy the technology of the
first investor, by for example choosing investment 1, the follower gets the same
level of profit as the first investor (either pih1 or pil1 depending on the outcome
of the ΩF -draw). However, if the second investor chooses not to follow the first
investor (i.e. by choosing investment 2), it will get a random profit rate, either
pih2 or pil2, according to the probability measure PF given that only pih2 or pil2 can
happen.
To simplify, we assume that the problem is symmetric, i.e. that pih1 = pih2 =:
pih, pil1 = pil2 =: pil and that the probabilities of high or low outcomes, respec-
tively, are the same for both investments. This means that we can remove the
technology choice for the first firm, and just look at nature’s choice of high or
low profit.
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1. investor
pih
pil
Nature
2. investor
Follow
Innovate
Follow
Innovate
Nature
pil
pih
pil
pil
pih
pih
Figure 1: A decision tree.
To model the exogenous and uncertain demand for the duopoly’s product,
we introduce another probability space (Ω,F , P ), and consider a Brownian mo-
tion (Bt)t∈[0,∞) in this space. Let (Ft)t∈[0,∞) be the filtration generated by
the Brownian motion. The process modeling the uncertainty in demand is a
geometric Brownian motion which we denote by (Zt)t∈[0,∞), such that
dZt = αZtdt+ σZtdBt.
Here, α, σ ∈ R+. Also, let r ∈ R+ be the interest rate. We assume α < r.
For the first firm to invest, we let the cost of any investment be I > 0. If
the second investor chooses to follow the leader, the investment cost is reduced
to (1 − θ)I, θ ∈ (0, 1), while the price for the other investment choice is still
I. The intuition is that it is more expensive to be innovative than to imitate
technology that already exists. After both firms have invested, no more choices
are made and the profit rates of the investors stay constant.
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3 The payoff functions
We want to describe a game where the firms can choose when to invest, so they
can influence whether they become the leader or the follower. In order to do
this, we must compute the expected payoff functions attained for the different
roles. More specifically, we will compute the following functions for all times
t ≥ 0, where we assume that the stochastic demand process Zt has value zt at
time t:
(i) C(zt): The payoff of both firms when they invest simultaneously at time
t, and the firms do not take the roles of leader and follower. Note that the
C stands for “Cournot” (see also Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [3]).
In this case, we assume that neither of the firms get any information
advantage or reduced investment cost.
(ii) F (zt): The payoff of the second investor given that the leader stops at
time t and that the follower is acting optimally.
(iii) L(zt): The payoff of the first investor who stops at time t and hence
becomes the leader, given that the other firm will act optimally as the
follower.
We divide the computation of these functions into several subsections.
In the following, E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the product
measure P × PF , also let EP [·] and EPF [·] denote the expectation w.r.t. the
measures P and PF respectively.
3.1 The Cournot case: C(zt)
Let pi be the random variable taking the values pil and pih with probabilities
determined by PF . Let E·zt [·] denote the expectation given that Zt = zt.
In the case where both firms invest exactly at time t and the Cournot out-
come is attained, their payoff functions are identical, and given by
C(zt) = Ezt [
∫∞
t
Z(s)e−r(s−t)pids− I]
= Ezt [
∫∞
0
Z(u+ t)e−ruE[pi]du− I]
= EPF [pi]
∫∞
0
EPzt [Z(u+ t)]e
−rudu− I
= EPF [pi] ztr−α − I.
(1)
Here, the first and the third equalities follow from Tonelli’s theorem, the second
equality from a change of variables and the final equality from that Z is a
geometric Brownian motion.
3.2 The follower’s payoff: F (zt)
We begin by finding the payoff function of the follower, hence we assume that one
of the firms has already invested at time t. Based on this we can later determine
the payoff of the leader who’s optimal behavior depends on the behavior of the
follower.
For the follower, two scenarios can occur: The leader got high profit pih or
low profit pil. The follower knows which profit level the leader got, and can
choose to copy or innovate based on this.
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3.2.1 The case where the leader got low profit: FL(zt)
If the leader got the low profit pil, the payoff function of the follower at the
leader’s investment time t is:
FL(zt) := e
rt supτ≥0 max
{
EP
[{∫∞
τ+t
pilZse
−rsds− (1− θ)Ie−r(τ+t)],
EP
[ ∫∞
τ+t
EPF [pi]Zse
−rsds− Ie−r(τ+t)]} (2)
where τ is the stopping time from the investment time of the leader until the
investment time of the follower (that is, τ + t is the investment time of the
follower).
The first expression in the maximum corresponds to copying the leader, while
the second expression corresponds to innovating. The first expression can be
rewritten:
EP
[
{∫∞
τ+t
pilZse
−rsds− (1− θ)Ie−r(τ+t)
]
= e−rtEPzt
[ ∫∞
τ
pilZse
−rsds− (1− θ)Ie−rτ
]
= e−rtEPzt
[
EP
[ ∫∞
τ
pilZse
−rsds− (1− θ)Ie−rτ |Fτ
]
= e−rtEPzt
[
e−rτ
( ∫∞
0
pilZ(τ)e
(α−r)sds− (1− θ)I)]
= e−rtEPzt
[
e−rτ Z(τ)pilr−α − (1− θ)Ie−rτ
]
where the second equality follows from double expectation, the third equality
from the strong Markov property for the Itô diffusion Zt (see also Øksendal [15]
exercise 7.11 for justification of the integral term) and the final equality follows
from that Zt is a geometric Brownian motion.
A similar computation shows that the second part of the maximum in prob-
lem (2) can be written
EPzt
[ ∫∞
τ+t
EPF [pi]Zse
−rsds− Ie−r(τ+t)]
= e−rtEPzt
[
e−rτ Z(τ)E
PF [pi]
r−α − Ie−rτ
]
.
Hence, problem (2) is equivalent to
FL(zt) = sup
τ≥0
EPzt [e
−rτ max
i=1,2
{aiZ(τ)−Ki}] (3)
where a1 := pilr−α , a2 :=
E[pi]
r−α , K1 := (1− θ)I and K2 := I. Note that K1 < K2
and a1 < a2.
Problem (3) is of the same form as the problems in Decamps et al [4] and
Nishihara and Ohyama [14]. As in these papers, we have to consider several
cases. The first case is 0 < a2a1 < 1, however since a1 < a2, this never occurs.
Let γ := 12 − ασ2 +
√
( ασ2 − 12 )2 + 2rσ2 > 1. The next case to consider is
1 < (a2a1 )
γ
γ−1 < K2K1 . Then,
FL(zt) =

A0z
γ
t if 0 < zt < z∗1,L
a1zt −K1 if z∗1,L ≤ zt ≤ z∗2,L
B0z
γ
t − C0zβt if z∗2,L < zt < z∗3,L
a2zt −K2 if zt ≥ z∗3,L
(4)
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where β := 12 − ασ2 −
√
( ασ2 − 12 )2 + 2rσ2 < 0 and A0, B0, C0 as well as the in-
vestment thresholds z∗1,L, z
∗
2,L, z
∗
3,L are determined using value matching and
smooth pasting conditions as in Dixit and Pindyck [5] (i.e. requiring continuity
and continuous differentiability of the value function FL). In particular, we find
that
z∗1,L =
γ
γ−1
(1−θ)I(r−α)
pil
,
A0 =
(1−θ)I
(γ−1)(z∗1,L)γ .
(5)
Similarly, we can also find z∗2,L, z
∗
3,L, B0 and C0, however we omit writing
these out since the expressions are long, and not necessary to know for our
purposes. However, we will use the fact that z∗1,L ≤ z∗2,L ≤ z∗3,L.
The values of this split function correspond to the following actions of the
follower (starting at the top): 1) Wait until the demand reaches z∗1,L, then copy
the leader. 2) Copy right away. 3) Wait, but make no decision to copy or
innovate. This decision depends on whether demand hits z∗2,L (copy) or z
∗
3,L
(innovate) first. 4) Innovate right away.
The optimal stopping time is
τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0|Z(t) ∈ [z∗1,L, z∗2,L] ∪ [z∗3,L,∞)}.
The reason for the waiting behavior in the interval (z∗2,L, z
∗
3,L) is due to the
structure of the follower’s payoff function
FL(zt) = sup
τ≥0
EPzt [e
−rτ max
i=1,2
{aiZ(τ)−Ki}],
as shown in equation (3). Since a1 < a2 and K1 < K2 there is a point zˆ where
a1zˆ −K1 = a2zˆ −K2, and at this point we have
D+FL(zˆ) > D
−FL(zˆ),
where D+, D− denotes the right and left derivatives respectively. Thus, at zˆ
the profit gain of a marginal increase in market demand is larger than the profit
loss of a marginal decrease in market demand. As a result, there is an open
nonempty interval containing zˆ where the follower is interested in waiting to see
how the market demand Z evolves. For more on this issue, see the paper by
Decamps et al [4].
The final case to consider is (a2a1 )
γ
γ−1 ≥ K2K1 . In this case,
FL(zt) =
{
B0z
γ
t if 0 < zt < z∗3,L
a2(t)zt −K2(t) if zt ≥ z∗3,L. (6)
The optimal stopping time is τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|Z(t) ≥ z∗3,L}. In this situation,
the follower waits until the demand reaches the level z∗3,L and then innovates.
3.2.2 The case where the leader got high profit: FH(zt)
In the case that the leader got the high profit pih, the payoff function of the
follower at time t has a similar form as the above situation:
7
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FH(zt) := e
rt supτ≥0 max
{
EP
[ ∫∞
τ+t
pihZse
−rsds− (1− θ)Ie−r(τ+t)],
EP
[ ∫∞
τ+t
EPF [pi]Zse
−rsds− Ie−r(τ+t)]}. (7)
However, since both pih > E[pi] and (1 − θ)I < I are true, it follows that the
first term in the maximum expression always is higher than the second. Thus,
the payoff function reduces to
FH(zt) =
{ I(1−θ)
γ−1
zt
z∗H
γ if 0 < zt < z∗H
pih
r−αzt − I(1− θ) if zt ≥ z∗H .
(8)
Here,
z∗H =
γ
γ − 1
r − α
pih
(1− θ)I
is the critical value such that the follower waits for all zt < z∗H and copies imme-
diately for zt ≥ z∗H (see e.g. Femminis and Martini [6] for solution procedure),
where γ is as before.
Note that z∗H < z
∗
1,L, i.e. the demand-threshold for the follower-firm invest-
ing when they are guaranteed a high profit is lower than the first investment
threshold in the low profit case.
3.3 The leader’s payoff: L(zt)
Now that we have determined the optimal behavior and payoff function for the
follower, we can derive the leader’s optimal value function L(zt). This payoff
function is the expectation (with respect to the probability measure correspond-
ing to nature’s choice of high or low profit) of the payoff functions in the case
where the leader gets high or low profit respectively. We let LL(zt) and LH(zt)
be the value functions in the low and high profit cases respectively. Then,
L(zt) = PF (low profit)LL(zt) + PF (high profit)LH(zt). (9)
Since we have assumed that the rest of the problem is symmetric, we assume
that
PF (high profit) = PF (low profit) =
1
2
.
We derive the two value functions LL(zt) and LH(zt) in the following sub-
sections.
3.3.1 The low profit case: LL(zt)
The leader’s payoff function depends on the behavior of the follower. Hence,
we have to take the structure of the function FL(zt) into consideration, see
Section 3.2.1. As in Section 3.2.1, we consider two cases.
First, we consider the case where 1 < (a2a1 )
γ
γ−1 < K2K1 (where the functions
a1, a2,K1,K2 are defined as in Section 3.2.1). The payoff function LL(zt) is the
payoff of the leading firm when it invests at time t, given that the follower then
behaves optimally.
By computations similar to those of Section 3.2.1, we can compute LL(zt) (as
we have assumed, due to symmetry, that the leader has no investment choice,
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and the investment time is t per definition of LL(zt)). For example, in the case
where 0 < zt < z∗1,L, we have
LL(zt) = E
P [
∫ t+τ∗
t
(pil + ξ)Z(s)e
−r(s−t)ds+
∫∞
τ∗+t pilZ(s)e
−r(s−t)ds− I]
= EP [
∫∞
t
(pil + ξ)Z(s)e
−r(s−t)ds− ∫∞
τ∗+t ξZ(s)e
−r(s−t)ds− I]
= zt(pil+ξ)r−α −
z∗1,Lξ
r−α E
P [e−rτ
∗ |Z(t) = zt]− I
= zt(pil+ξ)r−α −
z∗1,Lξ
r−α e
να1(t)−|α1(t)|
√
ν2+2r − I
= pilr−αzt +
ξ
r−αzt(1− ( ztz∗1,L )
γ−1)− I
where α1(t) := 1σ ln(
z∗1,L
zt
), ν := ασ − σ2 . Note that in the first equality, the
first integral corresponds to the monopoly benefit, which only lasts until the
follower invests (at time t + τ∗). Note also that the second equality follows by
adding and subtracting the monopoly benefit, the third equality follows from
a similar argument (using the strong Markov property for Itô diffusions) as in
Section 3.2.1 and the fourth equality follows from that {Zt}t≥0 is a geometric
Brownian motion, so we know the expectation of the first hitting time at the
investment level (for the follower) z∗1,L (see also Jeanblanc [12], section 8.1.3).
The final equality follows from some basic algebra.
Thus, we have
LL(zt) =

pil
r−αzt +
ξ
r−αzt(1− ( ztz∗1,L )
γ−1)− I if 0 < zt < z∗1,L
pil
r−αzt − I if z∗1,L ≤ zt ≤ z∗2,L
pil
r−αzt +M(zt)− I if z∗2,L ≤ zt ≤ z∗3,L
pil
r−αzt − I if zt ≥ z∗3,L
(10)
where,
M(zt) := (1− P (Z hits z∗3,L first|Z(t) = zt))EP [
∫ t+τ∗
t
ξZ(s)e−r(s−t)ds|Z hits z∗2,L first]
+P (Z hits z∗3,L first|Z(t) = zt)EP [
∫ t+τ∗
t
ξZ(s)e−r(s−t)ds|Z hits z∗3,L first].
(11)
Here, using that Z is a geometric Brownian motion (see Sigman [16])
P (Z hits z∗3,L first|Z(t) = zt) =
1− eα˜b
eα˜a − eα˜b
where a := ln( z
∗
3,L
zt
), b := ln( z
∗
2,L
zt
) and α˜ := 2|α|σ2 . By some basic algebra, we see
that
P (Z hits z∗3,L first|Z(t) = zt) =
1− ( z
∗
2,L
zt
)α˜
(
z∗3,L
zt
)α˜ − ( z
∗
2,L
zt
)α˜
.
The split in the value function of the leader, see equation (10), appears
because the leader does not know whether the demand process Zt will hit the
innovation level of the follower, z∗3,L, or the copying level of the follower, z
∗
2,L,
first. The splits have similar interpretations as those in Section 3.2.1.
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The final case is where (a2a1 )
γ
γ−1 ≥ K2K1 . From Section 3.2.1, we know that
in this case the follower-firm waits until the demand reaches the level z∗3,L and
then innovates. By similar calculations as in the previous case, we find that
LL(zt) =

pil
r−αzt +
ξ
r−αzt(1− ( ztz∗3,L )
γ−1)− I if 0 < zt < z∗3,L
pil
r−αzt − I if zt ≥ z∗3,L
(12)
3.3.2 The high profit case: LH(zt)
Again, the leader’s payoff function depends on the behavior of the follower. We
have
LH(zt) = E
P [
∫ t+τ∗
t
(pih + ξ)Zse
−r(s−t)ds+
∫∞
τ∗+t pihZse
−r(s−t)ds− I]
= EP [
∫∞
t
pihZse
−r(s−t)ds] + EP [
∫ τ∗+t
t
ξZse
−r(s−t)ds]− I.
The term EP [
∫ τ∗+t
t
ξZse
−r(s−t)ds] equals zero if the follower stops immedi-
ately after the leader, and equals
ξ
r − αzt(1− (
zt
z∗H
)(γ−1))
for zt ∈ (0, z∗H) (see Section 3.3.1).
Thus, we have that
LH(zt) =

pih
r−αzt +
ξ
r−αzt(1− ( ztz∗H )
(γ−1))− I if 0 < zt < z∗H
pih
r−αzt − I if zt ≥ z∗H .
(13)
3.4 Combining the expressions
To summarize, we have that the leader’s ex ante expected payoff is
L(zt) =
1
2
LH(zt) +
1
2
LL(zt), (14)
where we recall that z∗H < z
∗
1,L < z
∗
3,L, LL(zt) and LH(zt) are as in equa-
tions (12)-(13).
Similarly, the follower’s ex ante expected payoff is
F (zt) =
1
2
FH(zt) +
1
2
FL(zt), (15)
where FL(zt) and FH(zt) are as in Section 3.2.1 and equation (8).
By analyzing L(zt), F (zt) and C(zt) (as functions of the demand zt), we find
that C is a linear function satisfying C(0) = −I. The leader payoff function
L also satisfies L(0) = −I. However, L(zt) is strictly concave on (0, z∗1,L),
then equal to C(zt) for zt ∈ [z∗1,L, z∗2,L] and zt ≥ z∗3,L. What happens to L in
the interval [z∗2,L, z
∗
3,L] depends on the values of the parameters I, θ, α, r. The
follower’s payoff F satisfies F (0) = −I(1−θ). It is strictly convex in the interval
10
Dahl and Stokkereit
(0, z∗1,L). Also, it is greater than, but parallel to C(zt) (and therefore L(zt) as
well) for zt ∈ [z∗1,L, z∗2,L]. What happens in the interval [z∗2,L, z∗3,L] depends on
the parameters of the problem. For zt ≥ z∗3,L, F (zt) is linear with a steeper
slope than C(zt) and it is also larger than C(zt). An example of how the three
payoff functions may look is shown in Figure 2 below.
4 The stochastic game
In this section, we present a problem where the firms can choose when to invest,
hence influencing whether they become the leader or the follower. Our aim is
to illustrate that the timing of investment can become peculiar in a duopoly
where there are benefits both of being leader (monopoly benefit) and follower
(information benefit and reduced investment cost). The game we present is
based on games discussed in Huisman et al. [11] and Chevalier-Roignant and
Trigiorgis [3].
4.1 Defining the game
We consider a duopoly, with the two firms denoted firm 1 and firm 2. For a
subgame starting at time t0 ∈ [0,∞), a simple strategy for firm i (i = 1, 2) is
defined to be a function αt0i : [t0,∞)× Ω→ [0, 1] such that
• ∀ ω ∈ Ω, αt0i (·, ω) is RCLL and right differentiable, and ∀ t ≥ t0, αt0i (t, ·)
is Ft-measurable.
• If αt0i (t, ω) = 0 for t = inf{u ≥ t0|αt0i (u;ω) > 0}, then the right derivative
of αt0i (t;ω) is positive.
Furthermore, let
τi(t0;ω) :=
 ∞ if α
t0
i (t;ω) = 0 ∀ t ≥ t0
inf{t ≥ t0|αt0i (t;ω) > 0} otherwise,
and τ = min{τ1, τ2}.
The intuition of αt0i can be interpreted in two steps. First, firm i choosing
αt0i (t, ω) = 0 means that for the given scenario ω ∈ Ω, firm i is not at all
interested in becoming the leader firm at time t. If this holds for both firms in
a neighborhood of t, then no investment will occur at this time. Second, firm i
choosing αt0i (t, ω) > 0 means that firm i definitely wants investment to occur at
time t for the given scenario, and is willing to be the leader in order for this to
happen. However, the higher the level of αt0i (t, ω), the higher is the probability
that firm i actually becomes the leader given that also αt0j (t, ω) > 0.
A closed loop strategy for firm i is a collection of simple strategies
{(αti(·;ω))0≤t<∞}
with the property that
• for all u, v such that t ≤ u ≤ v <∞, we have αti(v;ω) = αui (v;ω) whenever
v = inf{s > t|Zs = Zv}.
11
Dahl and Stokkereit
The point of the above property is to ensure that the strategies of two
different subgames coincide at all times v that is a shared first hitting time
of a new state Zv for both games. This ensures that strategies are consistent
for the different subgames.
The expected discounted value of firm i of the subgame starting at time t0
given the simple strategies st0(ω) = {(αt0i (·;ω))i=1,2} is
Vi(t0, s
t0(ω)) = Et0 [e
−rτ(t0,ω)Wi(τ(t0, ω), st0(ω))]. (16)
Here, Et0 [·] := E[·|Ft0 ] and
Wi(τ, s
t0(ω)) =
{
L(Zτ (ω)) if τj(t0; ω) > τi(t0; ω),
F (Zτ (ω)) if τi(t0; ω) > τj(t0; ω).
Finally, if τi(t0; ω) = τj(t0; ω), then
Wi(τ, s
t0(ω)) = C(Zτ (ω)) if αt0i (τ ; ω)) = α
t0
j (τ ; ω)) = 1,
while
Wi(t0, s
t0(ω)) =[
αt0i (τ ; ω)(1− αt0j (τ ; ω))L(Zτ (ω)) + αt0j (τ ; ω)(1− αt0i (τ ; ω))F (Zτ (ω))
+αt0i (τ ; ω)α
t0
j (τ ; ω)C(Zτ (ω))
]
/[αt0i (τ ; ω) + α
t0
j (τ ; ω)− αt0i (τ ; ω)αt0j (τ ; ω)]
(17)
if 2 > αt0i (τ ; ω) + α
t0
j (τ ; ω) > 0 and
Wi(t0, s
t0(ω)) =
(αt0i )
′(τ ; ω)L(Zτ (ω)) + (αt0j )
′(τ ; ω)F (Zτ (ω))
(αt0i )
′(τ ; ω) + (αt0j )′(τ ; ω)
(18)
if αt0i (τ ; ω) = α
t0
j (τ ; ω) = 0. The functions L,F and C are as in Section 3.
For a given ω ∈ Ω a tuple of simple strategies
(s∗i )i=1,2 = (α
t0
i (t;ω))i=1,2
is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame starting at time t0 if for i = 1, 2
Vi(t0, s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ Vi(t0, si, s∗−i)
for all simple strategies si.
A pair of closed loop strategies {(αti(·;ω))0≤t<∞}i=1,2 is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if for all t ∈ [0,∞) (αti(·;ω))i=1,2 is a Nash equilibrium.
4.2 The case with a high monopoly benefit
We consider the case where 1 < (a2a1 )
γ
γ−1 < K2K1 , so the function FL(zt) is as in
equation (4). Furthermore, we let the monopoly benefit ξ be sufficiently large
so that the following conditions hold
• there exists z < z∗1,L such that L(z) > F (z),
• there exists z ∈ (z∗2,L, z∗3,L) such that L(z) > F (z).
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L C
F
z_t
A_1
A_2
Figure 2: Illustration of the value functions for the leader L, the follower F and
the Cournot case C (viewed as functions of the level of demand zt), as well as
the sets A1 and A2.
This situation will always happen for ξ sufficiently large, since we see from
equation (10) that L(z) becomes arbitrarily large for z < z∗1,L and z ∈ (z∗2,L, z∗3,L)
as ξ increases.
Thus, we are in the situation depicted in Figure 2, where the follower and the
leader value functions, F (z) and L(z), intersect twice. Let A1 and A2 denote the
two intervals where the leader’s payoff L(z) exceeds the follower’s F (z). Also,
recall that z∗1,L, z
∗
2,L, z
∗
3,L and z
∗
H are the investment thresholds of the follower
in the low and high profit cases respectively, see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
Let zA1min be the infimum ofA1, and let similar definitions hold for z
A1max, z
A2
min
and zA2max. Note that z
A1
min is the smallest level of demand such that L is greater
than or equal to F . We let T t
z
A1
min
denote the stopping time for when the process
is greater than or equal zA1min given we are at time t, with similar definitions for
zA1max, z
A2
min and z
A2max.
Under the assumptions above, we can prove the following result.
Theorem 4.1 There is no pure symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in this setting.
However, we have the following asymmetric equilibrium. For all t ≥ 0, let
αti(u) =

χB1(Zu) if u < T tzA1min
L(Zu)−F (Zu)
L(Zu)−C(Zu) if T
t
z
A1
min
≤ u < T t
z
A1
max
χB2(Zu) if T tzA1max
≤ u < T t
z
A2
min
L(Zu)−F (Zu)
L(Zu)−C(Zu) if T
t
z
A2
min
≤ u < T t
z
A2
max
χB3(Zu) if T tzA2max
≤ u
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and
αtj(u) =

0 if u < T t
z
A1
min
L(Zu)−F (Zu)
L(Zu)−C(Zu) if T
t
z
A1
min
≤ u < T t
z
A1
max
0 if T t
z
A1
max
≤ u < T t
z
A2
min
L(Zu)−F (Zu)
L(Zu)−C(Zu) if T
t
z
A2
min
≤ u < T t
z
A2
max
0 if T t
z
A2
max
≤ u,
where i 6= j. In the expression above, χ is the indicator function, and
B1 = {y ∈ (0, zA1min)|L(y) ≥ E[e−rT
y(z)L(z)] for all z ∈ (0, zA1min]},
B2 = {y ∈ [zA1max, zA2min)|L(y) ≥ E[e−rT
y(z)L(z)] for all z ∈ [zA1max, zA2min]},
B3 = {y ∈ [zA2max,∞)|L(y) ≥ E[e−rT
y(z)L(z)] for all z ∈ [zA2max,∞)},
where T y(z) is the expected hitting time for the demand process Zu to reach z,
given that its current value is y.
Proof.
The proof consists of two parts:
1. There is no subgame perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium:
We start by showing that no symmetric equilibrium exist. For this, let zt
be such that
C(zt) > sup{L(z)|z ∈ (0, zA2max]}, (19)
and assume that there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, i.e. simple strate-
gies α1, α2 such that αt1(u) = αt2(u) := αt(u) for all u.
• If τ(t) = ∞, i.e. αt(u) = 0 for all u ≥ t, then both firms will regret
their strategy. This follows since such a strategy st(ω) gives
Vi(t, s
t(ω)) = 0
for i = 1, 2. If for instance firm 1 instead choose αt1(t) = 1, then
τ(t) = t and the payoff becomes e−rtL(zt) > 0 instead, which is
better. Thus, we must have τ(t) <∞.
• If τ(t) < ∞, and if F (Zτ ) > L(Zτ ), then firm 1 will be better off
by choosing a strategy such that τ1 > τ2, for instance by setting
αt1(u) = 0 for all u such that F (u) > L(u). This is because the
former strategy gives payoff
Et[e
−rτW1(τ(t), st(ω))],
while any alternative strategy resulting in τ1 > τ2 gives payoff
Et[e
−rτF (Zτ )]
for firm 1. Since F (Zτ ) > L(Zτ ), it follows that F (Zτ ) > W1(τ(t), st(ω)),
which makes such an alternative strategy strictly better.
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If instead F (Zτ ) ≤ L(Zτ ), then we must have Zτ ≤ zA2max. However,
it then follows that the payoff
Vi(t, s
t(ω)) < Et[e
−rτC(zt)] ≤ e−rtC(zt),
where we in the first inequality use the fact that (due to the descrip-
tion of zt from (19))
C(zt) > sup{L(z)|z ∈ (0, zA2max]} ≥ sup{F (z)|z ∈ (0, zA2max]}.
As a consequence firm 1 will be better off choosing αt1(t) = 1, that is
τ1(t) = t, as this gives the payoff e−rtC(zt).
Thus, we have shown that there does not exist any symmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
2. The asymmetric strategy is an asymmetric subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium:
Next, we show that the described strategies is an asymmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. Based on the form of the functions αti, αtj , it is
natural to classify the different time intervals into two categories:
• Category 1, where the firms’ strategies are symmetric. That is, the
time intervals [T t
z
A1
min
, T t
z
A1
max
] and [T t
z
A2
min
, T t
z
A2
max
].
• Category 2, where the firms’ strategies are not symmetric. That is,
the time intervals (0, T t
z
A1
min
), [T t
z
A1
max
, T t
z
A2
min
) and [T t
z
A2
max
,∞).
We now consider the two categories of time intervals separately.
• Category 1. For u ∈ [T t
z
A1
min
, T t
z
A1
max
] ∪ [T t
z
A2
min
, T t
z
A2
max
], the strategies are
chosen symmetrically in such a way that
Vi(t, s
t(ω)) = Vj(t, s
t(ω)) = Et[e
−ruF (Zu))].
Abbreviating and writing st(ω) = s = (si, sj), we note that s is
chosen such that
Vi(t, s
′
i, sj) = Vi(t, s) = Vj(t, s) = Vj(t, si, s
′
j),
where s′i, s′j are any other strategy chosen by firm i and firm j re-
spectively. This can be verified by evaluating the expression in (17).
That is, the strategy s has the property that if only one firm changes
strategy to any other strategy, the payoff of this firm will be unal-
tered. Thus, for any of the firms there is nothing to be attained by
a change of strategy for time intervals belonging to Category 1.
• Category 2. For u ∈ (0, T t
z
A1
min
)∪ [T t
z
A1
max
, T t
z
A2
min
)∪ [T t
z
A2
max
,∞), the strat-
egy of firm i is chosen in such a way that the firm will invest as long as
investing and becoming leader is weakly better than waiting with the
investment. Otherwise, firm i will wait with the investment. Since
firm j is always waiting in time intervals belonging to Category 2,
by the definition of the strategy, firm i cannot be better off by any
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alternative strategy. Also, since the firms are ex ante identical, firm
j will not gain by choosing a strategy such that τj(u) < τi(u) for
any relevant u. And since we have L < F in this interval, having
αj(u) = 0 at times u where αi(u) > 0 is an optimal strategy for firm
j. We deduce that no firm gains by a change of strategy on time
intervals belonging to Category 2.
We conclude that the described strategy is a pure subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.

For values zt ∈ A1 ∪ A2 the outcome is just as in the standard preemption
game described in the literature, see e.g. Huisman et al. [11]. However, for all
other starting values of zt the situation is very different. Due to the information
spillover and lower price of investment, both firms have incentives to be the
follower. Consequently, we get a situation where the firms need to weight the
cost of investing before the other firm, versus the cost of waiting too long. One
solution of this dilemma is for one firm to refuse to take any action at all, in
which case the other firm behaves as in a monopoly setting, meaning the role
as leader will be taken. How this will be done in practice, when both firms are
equal, is an open question. In our described Nash equilibrium, firm j has the
characteristic of being more patient, while firm i is more eager to invest quickly.
In our described equilibrium, the timing of the investment may become pecu-
liar. If, for instance, B2 6= [zA1max, zA2min) (how B2 looks depends on the parameters
of the problem), then we have a scenario where
• no investment occurs for low values of zt
• investment occurs when zt ∈ [zA1min, zA1max]
• for some value zt ∈ (zA1max, zA2min) no investment occurs
• investment occurs for zt ∈ (zA2min, zA2max].
Thus a "vacuum" arises, where firms are happy to invest for lower and higher
market demand levels, but not for intermediate market sizes. The explanation
for such a vacuum is that in the set A1 ∪ A2 the firms are preempted to invest
immediately, since being leader is the most beneficial. Outside of this set the
preemption effect vanishes, as firms are reluctant to invest since being the fol-
lower is more beneficial. In this region and in our described equilibrium, firm
i will behave as a monopolist having the payoff function min{L(zt), F (zt)} for
all values zt, given that firm j is determined to become the follower.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a duopoly investment model with uncertainty and
two alternative investments. Being the first firm to invest gives a monopoly
benefit for a period of time, while the follower firm attains information and
cost reduction benefits. We have characterized the payoff functions for both the
leader and follower firm.
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Furthermore, we have considered a game where the firms can choose when to
invest, and hence influence whether they become the leader or the follower. The
scenario we study leads to a more complex investment structure than what has
been studied in previous literature. We show that no pure symmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium exists. However, an asymmetric equilibrium is char-
acterized in Theorem 4.1. In this equilibrium, two disjoint intervals of market
demand levels give rise to preemptive investment behavior of the firms, while
the firms otherwise tend to be more reluctant to be the first investor.
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